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Indologists are lucky. Unlike most other scholars who study the intellectual history of a 
major culture, their object of study does not exclusively consist of old texts. In India 
there is a living tradition of indigenous scholarship, which continues, in a more or less 
unbroken succession, the subjects that interest the modern scholar. It is no coincidence 
that the early European explorers of Sanskrit literature worked with Indian pandits, and 
that many modern scholars, too, draw considerable advantage from working with them. 
I am personally proud to have worked with several outstanding pandits in Poona, and 
there can be no doubt that this has been a major privilege. 
 Those who have worked with traditional pandits — and I repeat that I count 
myself among them — know that there is little hope that they will ever be able to 
compete with these pandits in their areas of specialisation, whether it be grammar, 
poetics, or one of the schools of Indian philosophy. Few modern scholars, and 
practically no modern western scholars, have been exposed to the various traditional 
disciplines of India at such a young age and in such an intensive fashion as the 
traditional pandit. This is a disadvantage which few modern scholars will ever 
completely overcome. 
 We arrive, then, at the following picture. The scholar of, say, early Greek 
thought has to reconstruct the object of his study with the help of surviving old texts, 
and with nothing else. There is no one around to help him (except other modern 
scholars who are in the same situation as he is), so that he is condemned to try to reach 
results on his own. The scholar of early Indian thought, on the other hand, finds that 
thought, those same branches of knowledge and enquiry, alive and well in modern 
India, and that at a level of competence which he cannot dream of attaining. This gives 
rise to some important questions, but perhaps not the ones that are most often asked. 
The question is not "What is the place of traditional Sanskrit scholarship in the study of 
Indian thought?", but rather: "What is the place of modern scholarship in the study of 
Indian thought?" or even better: "Is there place for modern scholarship in the study of 
Indian thought?" Is there anything modern scholarship can contribute to this field of 
study? Are modern scholars not doomed to be at best pale copies of the traditional 
scholars whom they cannot but try to imitate, normally with limited success? 
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 It seems that some modern Sanskrit scholars do indeed think that imitating 
traditional scholars should be their aspiration. Others disagree, and point out that 
traditional and modern Sanskrit scholars do not normally study [168] the same subject-
matter. Modern Sanskrit scholars — with the exception of some very few who study 
living traditional scholars and their ideas in their own right — concentrate on the past: 
on a particular period in the past, or on the development of certain ideas through a 
certain length of time. Traditional Sanskrit scholars, on the other hand, embody the 
present state of the tradition to which they belong. 
 This may be true, but it does not change the fact that both modern and traditional 
Sanskrit scholars study by and large the same texts. Moreover, if it is true, as is often 
maintained, that the traditional scholars are linked to the authors of the texts they study 
through an unbroken tradition, their interpretation of those texts will be more reliable 
than that by modern scholars, because it can make use of elements to which the modern 
scholar has no access, except by consulting the traditional scholar. Once again the 
question imposes itself whether anything is left for modern scholars to do beyond trying 
to become traditional scholars themselves. 
 Modern scholars may have reservations with regard to the unbroken tradition 
sometimes invoked by traditional scholars. In this they can draw inspiration from 
Dharmak¥rti, the famous Buddhist philosopher who was confronted with the same 
argument from the side of the M¥måµsakas. The latter claimed that not only the Veda, 
but also its explanation (i.e. the interpretation offered by the M¥måµsakas) was not 
made by human or other living beings (apauru∑eya), because it had been handed down 
by an unbroken tradition (saµpradåyåvicchedåt).1 Dharmak¥rti is not impressed and 
points out that cases are known where traditions have been changed for various reasons. 
That is to say, the modern scholar's sceptical attitude is not new, and the history of 
Indian thought itself provides examples of such an attitude. 
 I will use the time alotted to me to discuss some concrete examples where it can 
be maintained that modern Sanskrit scholarship has its mite to contribute. These 
examples have been taken from my own recent research, but rest assured: it does not 
really matter whether they convince you. They are just examples meant to illustrate a 
possible justification of modern Sanskrit scholarship besides traditional Sanskrit 
scholarship. I will begin with a general question: the question whether and to what 
extent it is possible to understand Indian philosophy. 
 This question may look surprising at first. At closer inspection, however, I 
assume that all of us have sometimes wondered how this or that thinker, or this or that 
                                                
1 Dharmak¥rti, Pramåˆavårttikasvav®tti, ed. Pandeya p. 350 l. 4: vedavad vyåkhyånam apy anådy 
apauru∑eyaµ saµpradåyåvicchedåd ågataµ tato 'rthasiddhi[˙]. 
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school of thought, could have adhered to their sometimes quite extraordinary doctrines. 
We may doubt whether we really understand these doctrines, and what is more, we may 
wonder whether the thinkers [169] themselves understood them. The Såµkhya 
philosophy, to take an example, proclaims the existence of twenty-five factors (which 
they call tattvas) which somehow evolve out of each other so as to create the 
phenomenal world. Did individual Såµkhya thinkers know why exactly these twenty-
five factors had to be accepted, and not any others? Did they perhaps accept these 
factors simply because they had been sanctioned by their particular tradition, and 
because early exposure lent them a degree of plausibility which they are unlikely to 
acquire for those who do not become acquainted with them until later in life? If this is 
the case, how much understanding can we, modern scholars, ever hope to attain? Are 
we condemned to merely record what the Indian thinkers thought, perhaps adding a 
historical dimension by investigating how some of these ideas succeed more or less 
similar earlier ones? Or a social one by pointing out that this or that position serves the 
interests of this or that particular philosopher and those of his group? Such 
investigations, which put Indian philosophy in its historical and social contexts, are 
certainly possible and extremely important. Historical continuities have been studied 
and more will no doubt be discovered. The link between at least certain philosophical 
doctrines and the social reality of those who accepted them deserves more attention than 
it has received so far.2 But is this as far as we can go? If so, our understanding of Indian 
philosophy will not be very different from that of Indian mythology: a number of just-
so stories which we can study in their historical and social contexts. 
 Advocates of Indian philosophy will no doubt object that there is much more to 
Indian philosophy than just this. They will point out that some of the discussions and 
analyses resemble, sometimes anticipate, certain discussions and analyses found in 
Western philosophy. Such advocates often have a tendency to take these discussions 
and analyses out of their original context and concentrate, say, on the development of 
logic in the Indian schools. There can be no doubt that logic underwent a remarkable 
development in India, and this still draws far too little attention outside a limited group 
of experts. But this logic was used — and this is too easily overlooked — to defend the 
basic doctrinal positions of the schools concerned. These doctrinal positions themselves 
are often somehow taken for granted, or even played down, by modern investigators. If 
we wish to give these positions their due, we are back with our original question: To 
what extent can we understand the thought of an Indian philosopher, not merely those 
                                                
2 A recently complete study by Vincent Eltschinger (forthcoming) concentrates on Brahmanic efforts — 
strongly criticized by Buddhist thinkers — to reify caste. 
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aspects of it which we choose (and which we remove from their original context) 
because they remind us of issues in Western philosophy? 
[170] 
 I will argue that a deeper understanding, one that goes beyond mere historical 
and sociological analyses, is possible in the case of at least part of Indian philosophy. 
This is due to a factor which only too rarely draws the attention of modern scholars. I 
am speaking of the presence of a tradition of rational enquiry. I use this expression to 
refer to a tradition which came to establish itself in India — or at least in the main 
philosophical schools — and which obliged thinkers to listen to the criticism of often 
unfriendly critics, even where it concerned their most sacred convictions, such as those 
supposedly based on revelation, tradition or inspiration. Confrontations between 
thinkers so radically opposed to each other were no doubt facilitated by the debates 
organised from time to time by kings, about which we have some first-hand information 
from the writings of Chinese pilgrims visiting India in the middle centuries of the first 
millennium. Little is known about the reasons why, and the date at which, this tradition 
of critical debate came to establish itself in India. Its effects are however visible in the 
efforts made by Indian thinkers to systematise their positions, to make them coherent 
and immune against criticism. 
 These reflections allow us to identify a particularly important factor in the 
development of Indian philosophy. Under pressure from competitors, the Indian 
thinkers of the early classical period were forced to do more than just preserve the 
teachings they had received; they had to improve and refine them — perhaps in order to 
avoid becoming the laughing stock of those they might have to confront at a royal court 
or on some other occasion. In doing so, they created systems of philosophy that might 
deviate considerably from the pre-systematic teachings which they had inherited. 
 The history of Indian philosophy, seen in this way, becomes the story of the 
search for coherence and immunity against criticism, starting normally — but not 
always, it seems — from some form of traditional teaching. This traditional teaching is 
usually of a non-philosophical nature. Buddhist philosophy in its various 
manifestations, for example, based itself ultimately on the teaching of the Buddha, 
which concerned the escape from suffering and rebirth and had no philosophical 
pretensions whatsoever. Several centuries separate the Buddha from the beginning of 
Buddhist systematic philosophy, centuries during which well-meaning monks had 
ordered and organised the original teaching in various way. Buddhist systematic 
philosophy, when it finally arose, was based upon, and continued, these attempts at 
ordering and organising. It tries to introduce coherence and draws conclusions. In this 
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way Buddhist philosophy arises out of the attempt to introduce order and coherence in 
the received teachings. Other schools of philosophy proceed similarly. 
 The extent to which different schools are willing to yield to criticism varies, at 
least in theory. A thinker like Bhart®hari represents one extreme. [171] Bhart®hari was 
both grammarian and philosopher. In the grammatical tradition he represents a change 
of attitude which Madhav Deshpande (1998:20), from the University of Michigan, does 
not hesitate to characterise as a paradigm-shift. Unlike his main predecessors who lived 
a number of centuries earlier, with Bhart®hari "an entirely new tone has set in. There is a 
strong feeling that the current times are decadent, and that there are no truly 
authoritative persons around. Grammarians in this decadent period must look back to 
the golden age of the great ancient grammarians and seek authority in their statements." 
In philosophy, too, the value of tradition cannot be overestimated. Here Bhart®hari 
observes: "Without tradition, logic cannot establish virtue (dharma); even the 
knowledge of seers derives from tradition."3 And again: "He who bases himself on 
tradition ... is not hindered by logical arguments."4  
 The author of the Mok∑opåya — a text of unknown date which became the 
kernel of a larger work, the Yogavåsi∑†ha — may illustrate the opposite extreme. We 
find here the following statement:5 “Even [if it is] of human origin, a treatise has to be 
accepted if it teaches with arguments. [If it is] different, on the other hand, it is to be 
discarded even if revealed by a seer. Only logic (nyåya) is to be adhered to. Even [if it 
comes] from a child, an argued statement has to be accepted. [Every statement that is] 
different is to be discarded, even if it has been uttered by [the creator god] Brahmå.”  
 It is hard to deny that Indian philosophies tended to gradually become more and 
more fossilised with the passing of time. To some extent many of them may have been 
rather rigid right from the beginning. Buddhist philosophers, for example, were not 
ready to abandon the words of the Buddha, even though they found various ways to 
reinterpret them, or even to discover and accept so far unknown, i.e. new, sermons 
which they ascribed to him. Bhart®hari's unwillingness to seriously consider anything 
that deviated from tradition has already been mentioned. Others did try to work 
                                                
3 Vkp 1.30: na cågamåd ®te dharmas tarkeˆa vyavati∑†hate/ ®∑¥ˆåm api yaj jñånaµ tad apy 
ågamapËrvakam// 
4 Vkp 1.41: caitanyam iva yaß cåyam avicchedena vartate/ ågamas tam upås¥no hetuvådair na 
bådhyate// 
5 Yogavåsi∑†ha 2.18.2-3 (as cited in Slaje, 1994:167): api pauru∑am, ådeyam ßåstraµ ced yuktibodhakam/ 
anyat tv, år∑am api, tyåjyam; bhåvyaµ nyåyaikasevinå// yuktiyuktam upådeyaµ vacanaµ bålakåd api/ 
anyat t®ˆam iva tyåjyam, apy uktaµ padmajanmanå// Slaje translates: "Auch wenn es von einem 
Menschen stammt, muss man ein Lehrwerk akzeptieren, soferne es mit Argumenten lehrt. [Jedes] andere 
dagegen ist zu meiden, auch [wenn] es von den Ù∑is stammt! Es ist nur die Methode (nyåya), der man 
anhängen darf. Sogar [wenn sie] von einem Kinde [komt], ist eine argumentative Aussage akzeptabel. 
[Jede] andere [dagegen] verwerfe man wie [nutzloses] Gras, selbst wenn sie von Brahmå behauptet 
wurde!" 
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independently of any particular tradition (with more or less success). I have the 
impression that Vaiße∑ika started off in this way. But Vaiße∑ika, too, [172] became a 
system whose doctrines were meant to be defended, not thoroughly revised.6 
 An ideal history of Indian philosophy — which should include the story of the 
search for coherence and immunity against criticism — will have to deal in detail with 
the ways in which various early teachings were transformed into coherent systems of 
thought. This is of necessity a somewhat technical endeavor, which I do not plan to 
undertake, at least not in this lecture. I will however cite some observations by Ben-
Ami Scharfstein which seem to me appropriate in the Indian situation (1998:522): 
"[The] progress [of every tradition of philosophy] depends ... on its necessary 
elaboration. This in turn depends on the answers given in the course of debate within 
the tradition itself and debate with external opponents, not to speak of the assimilation 
of useful fragments of other philosophies. If its historical continuity is unbroken, each 
philosophy is provided with successively better answers to its rivals and goes on 
building its structure higher, more firmly, and more elaborately. Given time, 
philosophical structures become fully elaborated, that is, worked out in the full detail 
that enriches and individualizes their culture. They then become summary expressions 
of these cultures, like the great Christian cathedrals, or the great Muslim mosques, or 
the great Hindu or Chinese temples or Buddhist stupas." But, "although it has 
progressed, [each philosophical school] appears no closer to victory over its rivals, 
which have also progressed" (p. 523). The history of Indian philosophy as I see it is the 
history of the elaboration of the different systems conditioned by the ongoing critical 
questioning by their rivals, and by the confrontation with other issues that threaten their 
internal coherence. 
 In their search for coherence and immunity against criticism Indian philosophers 
were confronted with the question to what extent their doctrines were compatible with 
certain convictions shared by all, or practically all, of them. Such shared convictions 
existed. I mention two of them in particular. Practically all philosophers of classical 
India believed in the doctrine of karma, and in the close connection between language 
and reality. The reflective analysis of these two convictions exerted a profound 
influence on the doctrines of the various schools. Some of these doctrines can indeed be 
looked upon as the direct outcome of this intellectual challenge. 
 The doctrine of karma exerted its influence at different times, and in different 
ways. It determined to a considerable extent the way in which the Brahmanical 
philosophies (to be distinguished from the Buddhist and [173] Jaina schools of thought) 
                                                
6 A noteworthy exception is Raghunåtha Íiromaˆi who, though in the tradition of Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika, 
demolishes a number of Vaiße∑ika categories; see Potter & Bhattacharyya, 1992:529 f. 
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were initially formulated, and raised again new questions centuries later. Let us first 
consider the earlier period. 
 The doctrine of karma, it may here be recalled, states that the deeds of living 
beings lead to punishment or reward (depending on the nature of the deeds) in this life 
or in a next one. Those who accept this doctrine are most often depicted in the Indian 
situation as looking for ways to escape from the resulting cycle of rebirths. Some do so 
by trying to abstain from all activity whatsoever; they practise asceticism in ways that 
cannot be considered at present. Others are convinced that their innermost self is 
different from all that acts; knowing one's true inactive nature implies being separated 
from one's deeds and freed from the effects of those deeds. In other words, knowledge 
of the self equals, or leads to, liberation. 
 Most Brahmanical philosophies are based on this vision of a totally inactive self 
which somehow interacts with the rest of the world which is constituted of everything 
that moves or acts. This division into two fundamentally distinct realms — an inactive 
but conscious self (puru∑a) and an unconscious but active rest of the world (pradhåna / 
mËlaprak®ti) — is the basis of the Såµkhya philosophy. The other major Brahmanical 
ontology of early classical India, Vaiße∑ika, adopts basically the same division, be it in a 
more sophisticated garb. Most other Brahmanical philosophies stick to the same basic 
scheme, so that it is possible to maintain that most of them are, at their very basis, 
responses to the challenge posed by the doctrine of karma. 
 I do not wish to dwell for long on this early period, but rather leave the doctrine 
of karma for the time being aside and turn to the other shared conviction I mentioned: 
the belief in the correspondence between language and reality. This belief has roots 
both in Vedic religion and in certain developments inside Buddhism, but since this 
lecture concentrates on the attempts at systematisation in response to challenges rather 
than on the origin of the challenges, I will not explore this issue here (cp. Bronkhorst, 
1996).  
 Correspondence between language and reality means first of all that the objects 
in the phenomenal world correspond to the words of language. This may sound 
innocent enough, but was given quite amazing twists by certain thinkers. Many 
Buddhists, for example, had come to believe that the objects of our phenomenal world 
do not really exist. What are they then, and why do we tend to think they exist? The 
answer is: they are nothing but words, or if you like: notions imposed upon reality by 
the words of language. Most Brahmanical thinkers disagreed with the imputed unreality 
of the phenomenal world, but agreed that there is a close connection between words and 
things. Some of them went to the extent of analysing the use of words in order to arrive 
at a deeper understanding of objective reality. 




 All these developments, though important, cannot be dealt with in this lecture. 
However, the belief in the correspondence between language and reality was, during the 
early centuries of the common era, extended from a mere belief in the correspondence 
between words and things to something more encompassing which includes the 
conviction that also statements correspond to the situations they describe, or more 
precisely: the words that make up a statement correspond to the "things" that constitute 
the situation described. Once again this conviction looks relatively harmless at first 
sight. After all, a statement like "John eats an apple" might be taken to describe a 
situation which is constituted by the three elements John, the apple, and the act of 
eating. Many, perhaps most, statements are such that they do not necessarily clash with 
this conviction, but some do. Take "John makes a vase". This statement describes a 
situation in which John and the act of making have their place, but the vase is not yet 
there. In other words, the words that make up the statement "John makes a vase" do not 
correspond to the "things" that constitute the situation described. The same difficulty 
arises whenever statements are made about making something or about coming into 
being. If we say "The vase comes into being" there is clearly nothing in the situation 
described corresponding to the word "vase". 
 I am sure that many people nowadays would conclude from statements like 
"John makes a vase" and "the vase comes into being" that apparently the words of a 
statement do not always correspond to the elements that make up the situation 
described. This would certainly be my reaction. Interestingly, to the best of my 
knowledge all Indian thinkers of the first five or more centuries of the common era did 
not draw this conclusion. I have studied the question in some detail and considered the 
writings of authors belonging to practically all currents of philosophy belonging to the 
three major religions of that period: Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism. The results of 
this investigation have appeared in a recently published monograph (Bronkhorst, 1999). 
To my growing surprise I found that all these thinkers held on to this position and tried 
in various ways to resolve the difficulties it gave rise to. All of them believed that the 
words of a statement correspond to the elements that make up the situation described, 
also in the case of statements like "John makes a vase" and "the vase comes into being". 
 I will discuss in a minute some of the solutions that were offered to the problems 
that arise in this manner. First however I wish to deal with a question that may cross 
your minds at this point. Why did the Indian thinkers of that period, all of them, hold on 
to a conviction that is so obviously in contradiction with everyday experience? Is this 
another example of intellectuals accepting a position whose absurdity is visible to a 
child? Is this one more case of philosophers gone haywire? 
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 I am not at all inclined to draw any such conclusions, and I would like to draw 
attention to two factors which no doubt encouraged the thinkers of [175] that time not to 
give up their position simply because it seemed to contradict everyday experience. For 
one thing, a number of thinkers, most notably the Buddhists, had already for other 
reasons come to the conclusion that the phenomenal world is not ultimately real. A 
contradiction between phenomenal reality and the conviction they cherished could not, 
therefore, endanger this conviction. Equally important is the the presence in India at that 
time of a tradition of rational enquiry, which I mentioned earlier. Philosophers had 
become convinced that their reasons and arguments were entitled to being taken 
seriously, as seriously or even more so than tradition, revelation, and insight. We know 
that in ancient Greece some thinkers, the Eleatics, did not hesitate to reject perceived 
reality on the basis — not of tradition, revelation, or special insight — but of mere 
argument. The early Indian thinkers, too, proceeded on the basis of their newly acquired 
confidence in the power of human reason. Those of us who feel superior to them might 
do well to recall that our phenomenal reality, too, hides a plethora of entities that 
deviate widely from our experience — molecules, atoms, subatomic particles — the 
existence of which we willingly accept on the basis of reasons provided and 
experiments carried out by others. 
 What solutions did the Indian thinkers offer to the difficulties they thus 
encountered, and which we might be tempted to consider to be of their own making? 
What does the word "vase" refer to in the sentences "John makes a vase" and "the vase 
comes into being"? The literature concerned contains a variety of answers, as I said 
earlier. Here I will concentrate on only two of them. 
 Perhaps the simplest and in a way most obvious answer was adopted by the 
Såµkhya school of Brahmanical philosophy, mentioned earlier in this lecture. We have 
various sources that contain information related to the early history of this school, even 
though the correct evaluation of this material by scholars has not so far been fully 
successful. In spite of this, most elements of its classical teachings figure in early 
works, such as the great epic of India, the Mahåbhårata, and other texts.7 One important 
element, however, is never mentioned in these earlier accounts, and must have been a 
rather recent innovation. I am speaking of satkåryavåda, the doctrine according to 
which the effect is present in its material cause. Very concretely this means that the 
situation described by the statement "John makes a vase", or "the vase comes into 
being", contains already a vase, be it that the vase at that moment is not yet visible. 
                                                
7 For recent discussions of Såµkhya in the Mahåbhårata, see Bisschop/Bakker, 1999 and Brockington, 
1999. 
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 Satkåryavåda becomes an essential part of classical Såµkhya philosophy, is 
taken over by some schools and vehemently combated by others. [176] The scholastic 
debates about this issue in later texts make one easily forget how profoundly strange 
this doctrine really is — not only for modern Western readers. They may have as a 
further effect that the doctrine becomes familiar, and that one stops being surprised by 
its extraordinary content. Familiarity is easily mistaken for understanding. A better 
understanding, I submit, can be obtained by becoming aware what specific problem the 
doctrine was meant to solve. In the case of satkåryavåda — I maintain — this problem 
was the direct consequence of certain ideas regarding the relationship between language 
and reality shared by all thinkers of that time. 
 The problem was shared by all thinkers, but they did not all propose the same 
solution. An altogether different solution was proposed by a particularly famous 
thinker, Någårjuna. In order to understand his solution we have to take into account that 
Någårjuna was a Buddhist. The Buddhists of his time, as I pointed out earlier, had come 
to believe that the phenomenal world does not really exist. This belief had not been part 
of the message taught by the historical Buddha. It was rather the result of subsequent 
elaborations and reinterpretations of the early teachings. Whatever the details of this 
development — with which we cannot deal at this moment — the Buddhists had come 
to believe, on the presumed authority of the Buddha, that the phenomenal world does 
not really exist; they could not prove this. This changed with Någårjuna. Någårjuna 
could prove what many Buddhists of his time were convinced of at any rate, viz., that 
the phenomenal world does not exist. It does not exist, because it cannot exist. And it 
cannot exist because it is self-contradictory. 
 The basic argument to prove this has already been sketched above. The 
statement "the vase comes into being" describes a situation which must contain a vase. 
It does not, however. The statement is therefore contradictory and nothing comes into 
being. I will cite one verse from Någårjuna's MËlamadhyamakakårikå which deals with 
this particular problem. It states:8 "If any unproduced entity is found anywhere it could 
be produced. Since that entity does not exist, what is produced?" In the case of our vase 
this means: if there is a vase at the time it is going to be produced, it can be produced. If 
there is no such vase, the subject of "the vase is produced" has nothing to refer to, and 
the statement is empty. This is true if we assume, as did apparently Någårjuna, that the 
terms of a statement have to refer to something that is there in the situation described. 
 Någårjuna proved, with this and similar arguments, what a number of Buddhists 
had already believed before and without him. He did however more. By introducing 
                                                
8 MadhK(deJ) 7.17: yadi kaßcid anutpanno bhåva˙ saµvidyate kvacit/ utpadyeta sa kiµ tasmin bhåve 
utpadyate 'sati//. 
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these rather nihilistic arguments into Buddhist philosophy he created his own school of 
philosophy which, known by the name [177] Madhyamaka or Mådhyamika, survived 
for a long time in India and to this day among Tibetan Buddhists. 
 My reflections so far have shown, I hope, that at least two crucially important 
doctrines held by different schools of Indian philosophy found their historical origin, 
not in meditative experience or supernatural revelation, but in the need to deal with 
difficulties arising from positions taken. The satkåryavåda of Såµkhya and the nihilism 
of Madhyamaka are both to be understood as responses to a conviction, shared by all 
thinkers of that time, concerning the relationship between language and reality which at 
first view would barely seem to justify such encompassing metaphysical conclusions. 
 Let me say a few more words about the doctrine of karma. We have already seen 
that this dogma profoundly influenced the fundamental shape of several Brahmanical 
schools of thought. We now turn to some later effects of this dogma on Indian thought. 
 I have already several times mentioned the tradition of rational enquiry without 
which the history of classical Indian philosophy cannot be correctly understood; I think 
this is a point that cannot be sufficiently emphasized. The classical Indian schools of 
thought could not afford to present a mere bunch of incoherent ideas. They had to deal 
with inconsistencies and other blemishes, and somehow iron them out. This critical, and 
therefore self-critical, approach could not but force them to confront the question as to 
how karma is supposed to work. If the deeds I carry out in this life bring about results in 
a next life, by what mechanism do they do so? The question became particularly 
difficult for those thinkers who were of the opinion that the deeds of living beings 
literally shape the future world. Texts like Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya — 
one of the most important dogmatic texts of Indian Buddhism during the classical 
period — leave no doubt about it that the shape of the world is determined by the deeds 
that living beings have carried out in an earlier world period. How should we imagine 
this process to have taken place? 
 Time does not permit me to discuss the issue and the solutions offered in detail. 
It seems however likely that Praßastapåda introduced the notion of a creator God into 
Vaiße∑ika precisely in order to explain the mechanism of karmic retribution. And 
Vasubandhu, the Buddhist thinker who turned to idealism later in his life (if the legend 
about his life is to be believed) did so in order to make the link between deeds and their 
effects intelligible: both now found their place in the mental continuum of a person, and 
karmic efficacy was no more puzzling than the occurrence of a dream. 
 Both Praßastapåda and Vasubandhu took radical decisions which were to have 
consequences for the further development of Indian thought. They did so because they 
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saw no other way to account for a dogma which they accepted as certain: the dogma of 
karmic retribution. 
[178] 
 After these examples of major doctrines that can be understood, or even have to 
be understood, as reactions to challenges which their authors had to face, I would like to 
consider one of these, the satkåryavåda of the Såµkhyas, somewhat more closely. This 
doctrine, even though originally an answer to a challenge, gradually became one more 
dogma characterising the Såµkhya school of thought. From a solution to a dilemma it 
became another truth one had to accept if one wanted to be a Såµkhya. The original 
problem is slowly forgotten and seems to gradually attract less attention in the 
philosophical literature. 
 Compare now our understanding of the doctrine of satkåryavåda with that of a 
Såµkhya thinker for whom this doctrine is no more than a simple dogma, who is no 
longer aware of the original problem which this doctrine was meant to solve. In such a 
case it can plausibly be argued that we understand this doctrine better than the Såµkhya 
thinker concerned, in the sense that we know — supposing that the explanation I have 
proposed is correct — something which this Såµkhya thinker does not know. We 
presumably know why this doctrine was introduced in the first place, while he doesn't. 
Some of his predecessors did, of course. The Såµkhya thinkers who introduced 
satkåryavåda knew why they did so, and so did some later Såµkhya thinkers, though 
perhaps less clearly. 
 Consider with this in mind the following criticism of the historical approach, 
exemplified in a passage formulated by Gerald James Larson almost twenty years ago 
(1980:305): "Quite apart from the merit or lack of merit of an historical interpretation, it 
appears that South Asians themselves seldom if ever used such an explanation. ... [B]y 
providing historical interpretations of South Asian thought and culture modern 
interpreters are more or less talking to themselves. There is nothing wrong with the 
latter enterprise, for at some stage in our work we as modern interpreters of South Asian 
culture must ‘encompass’ (in Dumont's sense) what South Asian culture represents in 
our experience. The crucial methodological issue, however, is that the ‘encompassed’ 
can never pass itself off as an adequate characterization of an indigenous interpretation. 
In other words, to put it directly, historical interpretation is ours, not theirs! In a South 
Asian environment, historical interpretation is no interpretation. It is a zero-category." 
This passage suggests that modern scholarship in an important way misses the point, 
and cannot claim to add anything to the understanding of Indian thought beyond an 
attempt to adjust it to our experience. If Larson is right, a traditional scholar cannot 
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possibly learn anything from modern scholarship, except perhaps an understanding of 
how we think. 
 Let us stick to the example of satkåryavåda. Our historical interpretation 
maintains that this doctrine was introduced to answer a specific problem, which I have 
tried to identify. The modern Såµkhya-pandit supposedly is [179] no longer aware of 
this problem. He knows his Såµkhya and is not looking for a historical understanding 
of its doctrines. Does this mean that our historical interpretation is only ours, not theirs, 
as Larson maintained? I hope you will agree with me that our historical interpretation, 
assuming it is correct, may not be that of the modern adherent of the Såµkhya system, 
but is nevertheless very much theirs, in the sense that those who introduced 
satkåryavåda did it for the reasons which our historical method has tried to rediscover. 
If, then, modern interpreters of Såµkhya are more or less talking to themselves, as 
Larson puts it, then for the simple reason that the creators of classical Såµkhya have 
been dead for a long time, and because today’s Såµkhya-pandits are not interested to 
know why the doctrine of satkåryavåda was created in the first place. Let me add 
immediately that this example is hypothetical. I do not know whether today’s Såµkhya-
pandits are or are not interested in this question, and what is more, I am not sure there 
are nowadays traditional scholars in India who adhere to the Såµkhya tradition.9 If 
there are, and if they share our interest in the question why the doctrine of satkåryavåda 
was created, they will join us in our research, and provide historical interpretations of 
South Asian thought just like us. Of course, Larson is right if he maintains that 
historical research will not help us much to understand a modern pandit who is not 
interested in the how and why of his received beliefs. But he is wrong if he thinks that 
historical research cannot answer questions that anyone, including a traditional pandit, 
may ask. 
 Let me, by way of conclusion, return to the question of the relationship between 
the modern academic study of Indian philosophy and the still living traditions of 
philosophy in present-day India. I know from experience that many traditional scholars 
— whose numbers, unfortunately, are dwindling — have a mastery over their particular 
fields which few scholars who have not already in their childhood had the advantage of 
a traditional training can hope to attain. I am therefore deeply convinced of the value of 
the Indian traditions, and of the importance to learn from them as long as this is still 
possible. But this does not mean that modern scholars should have as principal aim to 
become imitation pandits. In some ways modern scholars may never understand Indian 
philosophy as well as traditional scholars do. In other ways, they may understand it 
                                                
9 K.C. Dutt’s Who’s Who of Sanskrit Scholars in India 1991 enumerates, to be sure, twenty-two names 
under the heading Såµkhya (p. 560-61). But they all have other areas of specialisation besides this one, 
and Dutt’s book says nothing about the personal allegiance of the scholars mentioned. 
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better. They may understand it better by bringing in the historical dimension, by taking 
into consideration the context [180] in which the various schools of thought arose and 
survived, and by bringing to light the problems which the central doctrines of the 
philosophical schools were meant to solve. Traditional scholars are of course more than 
welcome to join and contribute to a better understanding of the thought of their spiritual 
and philosophical ancestors, and it is very rewarding to see that a number of them 
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